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PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE FATE OF STRICT LIABILITY UNDER THE
MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
KALYANI ROBBINS*
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) contains a very broad ban on harming migratory
birds, as well as a strict liability standard for misdemeanor violations. Without further
limitation, the MBTA would theoretically apply to countless ordinary life activities, such as
driving a car or having windows on one’s home. Naturally, there are due process concerns with
such a scenario, so Congress expressly left it to the Department of the Interior to draft more
detailed implementing regulations. Unfortunately, the existing regulations fail to adequately
address the potential overbreadth of the MBTA’s misdemeanor application, forcing the courts to
do so on an ad hoc basis. Such individualized legal analyses create the risk of developing bad
law as a result of less-than-ideal test cases. This is exactly what took place in United States v.
Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010), the only appellate case dealing with the
MBTA’s strict liability standard in the context of industrial harms—the current trend for
enforcement—in several decades. In that case, the Tenth Circuit applied a “knew or should have
known” standard to an industrial actor causing bird deaths, holding that criminal liability only
attaches after the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has directly notified the defendant in writing of
the danger his equipment presents to birds. This is a terrible case, as it completely writes the
strict liability standard out of the statute. This Article argues that regulations—or even a written
enforcement policy—that create prosecutorial limitations to avoid violating due process will
prevent courts from struggling to cope with the MBTA’s theoretically broad reach, which can
result in bad law. It sorts through the historical development of strict liability, especially in the
public welfare offense context, and proposes that those engaged in activities where regulation
should be foreseen—such as operating oil rigs, as in Apollo Energies—should be held to a
higher standard than others. This is in line with the Supreme Court case law justifying strict
liability in the face of due process challenges. Ultimately, the Article concludes that such across-
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the-board line drawing for the MBTA’s strict liability provisions would have prevented the Tenth
Circuit from deciding Apollo Energies as it did.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hemisphere solidarity is new among statesmen, but not among the feathered
navies of the sky. -- Aldo Leopold1
I realized that if I had to choose, I would rather have birds than airplanes. -Charles A. Lindbergh2
Birds should be saved because of utilitarian reasons; and, moreover, they should
be saved because of reasons unconnected with any return in dollars and
cents. . . . [T]o lose the chance to see frigate-birds soaring in circles above the
storm, or a file of pelicans winging their way homeward across the crimson
afterglow of the sunset, or a myriad terns flashing in the bright light of midday as
they hover in a shifting maze above the beach—why, the loss is like the loss of a
gallery of the masterpieces of the artists of old time. -- Theodore Roosevelt3
There is a constant tension in all areas of wildlife regulation. On the one hand is the
somewhat understandable prioritization of a modern lifestyle and comforts over the protection of
creatures we barely understand. On the other hand we have our highly disciplined legislative
choices made long ago, at a time when the political climate and economic needs were somewhat
different than they are today. Why should a little fish nobody previously knew existed halt
completion of a major dam project on which millions of dollars have already been spent? 4 Who
really cares about some irritating fly when there are so many people crammed into southern

*Associate Professor, University of Akron School of Law. Thanks go to Dan Rohlf for inviting me to write this
symposium piece, to the faculties at the University of San Francisco School of Law and the University of Akron
School of Law for their helpful input during draft workshops, and to the amazing bird advocates at the symposium
presentation whose thoughtful questions brought a more practical perspective to the issues in this paper.
1
ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 35 (1949).
2
Alden Whitman, Lindbergh Traveling Widely as Conservationist, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1969, at 1, 26 (quoting
Lindbergh).
3
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, A BOOK-LOVER’S HOLIDAYS IN THE OPEN 316–17 (1916).
4
See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 159, 171–73 (1978) (prohibiting completion of a dam that would
have eradicated the snail darter, an endangered species, or destroyed its critical habitat).
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California and desperate for more living space?5 Thankfully, with the development of the
relatively new scientific field of conservation biology, we are beginning to understand the
importance of keeping every cog in the wheel, but because not everyone is onboard, strict
protective laws remain essential.
The focus of this symposium is on migratory birds in particular, so the policy question is
narrower. To what lengths must we go to avoid harming migratory birds, and how much must be
sacrificed for each handful of bird deaths prevented? Further, and of particular relevance to this
Article: how much research must we do, individually and proactively, on the potential risks we
create for migratory birds? How much can we be expected to anticipate? Are some of us
burdened with a greater responsibility than others to learn about migratory birds and their habits?
My answer, which this Article endeavors to support, is that those who present a greater risk than
that posed by the average member of the public should be held to a higher duty. When it comes
to commercial activity, regulation is to be expected. The strict liability offenses found in the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA)6 should be enforced with the purest form of strict liability
when dealing with industrial harms.
Part II of this Article will establish, as a preliminary matter, that there is no remaining
question that the misdemeanor offenses in the MBTA are to be enforced with strict liability. Part
III will review strict liability itself in an effort to determine how it is to be applied, both as a
policy matter and in preserving due process. This Part will follow the progression of the standard
from its roots into the modern realm of environmental offenses, an area in which it arguably fits
best. Part IV focuses on a particularly disconcerting recent case out of the Tenth Circuit. The
criticism contained in the same Part is due both because the case creates bad law and because it
has arguably taken over the position as the definitive authority on the application of the MBTA’s
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See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (affirming the lower court’s
application of section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006 & Supp. IV
2010), to the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly (Rhaphiomidas terminatus abdominalis); section 9(a)(1) is 16 U.S.C. §
1538(a)(1) (2006)).
6
16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). Strict liability is addressed in 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006).
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strict liability standard. Finally, what we can glean from the state of case law in this area is that
we absolutely must sort through the possible applications of the statute and derive a sensible and
relatively uniform system to make it work as strongly as possible without offending due process.
Part V proposes such a plan.
II. STRICT LIABILITY IS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED FOR MBTA MISDEMEANORS
While the initial matter of establishing that the MBTA imposes strict liability for its
misdemeanor offenses is an important one, it is also one that can be achieved quickly. There is
little controversy on this issue. The MBTA began as a purely strict liability statute, but was later
amended to add a mens rea requirement for its felony provisions.7 It now distinguishes between
misdemeanors and felonies in its penalty provisions as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person, association,
partnership, or corporation who shall violate any provisions of said conventions or
of this subchapter, or who shall violate or fail to comply with any regulation made
pursuant to this subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $15,000 or be imprisoned not
more than six months, or both.
(b) Whoever, in violation of this subchapter, shall knowingly—
(1) take by any manner whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to sell,
offer to sell, barter or offer to barter such bird, or
(2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both.8
In the 1986 amendments requiring mens rea for felony violations, Congress added the
above-cited “knowingly” to section 707(b)9 after a case found the felony provisions in the
MBTA unconstitutional,10 even though strict liability felonies had been upheld in other
contexts.11 In response to remaining concerns about strict liability in certain special
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United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 686 (10th Cir. 2010).
16 U.S.C. § 707(a)–(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
9
Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-645, § 501, 100 Stat. 3582, 3590 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006)) (providing that the knowledge requirement only goes to the fact that actions constitute sale,
barter, or offer to sell migratory birds).
10
United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1122 (6th Cir. 1985).
11
See, e.g., United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 433–36 (3d Cir. 1986).
8
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circumstances, Congress further amended the MBTA to make it unlawful to hunt over baited
fields where “the person knows or reasonably should know that” he or she is hunting over baited
fields.12
Throughout the several occasions that Congress amended the mens rea requirements
under the MBTA, and in spite of the clear trend of such amendments chipping away at strict
liability, it repeatedly left general misdemeanor violations alone. When adding the term
“knowingly” to section 707(b), Congress left section 707(a) without it.13 This was no accident, as
the legislative history of the amendment makes clear: “Nothing in this amendment is intended to
alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for misdemeanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. 707(a), a
standard which has been upheld in many Federal court decisions.”14 The vast majority of courts
addressing the issue have upheld strict liability as the correct standard for MBTA
misdemeanors.15 What is less consistent, however, is how to apply this standard. That, of course,
is the main concern of this Article.
III. HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT LIABILITY
Before we can take a meaningful look at the methods courts are using in applying the
strict liability standard under the MBTA, it is necessary to understand strict liability in general. It
is my position that strict liability has recently been applied differently in the MBTA context—
erroneously—so I must begin with a proper investigation into that from which it differs.
A. Mens Rea
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Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-312, § 102, 112 Stat. 2956, 2956 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 704(b)(1) (2006)).
13
16 U.S.C. § 707(a)–(b) (2006).
14
S. REP. NO. 99-445, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128.
15
See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 614–16 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796,
805 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Smith, 29 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); Engler, 806 F.2d at 431; United
States v. Chandler, 753 F.2d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984);
United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978); Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th
Cir. 1966). C.f. United States v. Wood, 437 F.2d 91, 92 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (affirming the finding that “if
scienter was an element, the flight of appellants supplied a basis for such an inference”).
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Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.16
The association between criminal liability and a guilty mind goes back many centuries—
at least to the thirteenth century and possibly several earlier than that.17 Blackstone commented
that “to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vi[c]ious will.”18 Some
would even say that the mental element has been relevant in criminal law from “time
immemorial.”19 That said, many historians do not believe that there was always a mental element
to criminal laws, but rather hold that it was the church that injected this form of morality into
what had previously been merely about causing harm to society, arguing that the church’s
addition was in part based on a theory of vengeance.20 But from a utilitarian standpoint, which
arguably is the societally stronger basis for policy, vengeance is of only little value, and only to
the few who have directly suffered at the criminal’s hands.
What we need most, in order to be capable of living among so many millions of others
who are not necessarily concerned with our best interests, is deterrence. Of course, there is a
place for mens rea in this deterrent ideal. It is easiest to deter that which is done intentionally.21
When an individual has a criminal plan or purpose, and assuming he is among those who are
capable of weighing the costs and benefits of proceeding with their evil plans, it is quite easy for
him to combine the variables of punishment and likelihood of capture to weigh against the
achievement of the wrongful goal.22 This cost benefit analysis is at the heart of the deterrent goal

16

Bruce R. Bryan, The Battle Between Mens Rea and the Public Welfare: United States v. Laughlin Finds a Middle
Ground, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 157, 159 n.11 (1995) (“[A]n act does not make a person guilty unless his mind is
guilty[].”).
17
See Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L.
REV. 337, 338 n.4 (1989).
18
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 21 (reprt. 1966).
19
Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Law Without It: Rationale and the West Virginia Rule, 58 W. VA. L.
REV. 34, 34–35 (1955).
20
See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 975 (1932).
21
See Philip J. Cook, Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the Second Decade, in 2 CRIME
AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 211, 216–18 (1980).
22
Id. at 216.
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of criminal law, and is most accessible to those who know that what they are about to do is
wrong.23
That said, and while we cannot have proper vengeance without mens rea, there will be
times when certain, otherwise innocent, behaviors will need to be regulated, both to achieve
uniformity where needed and to reduce the risks the behaviors may create. The question is: can
deterrence be accomplished without mens rea? It is my position that it can, that some choices
and involvements come with heightened duties of care, and that ignorance of the risks created is
itself a behavior that can be deterred. Ignorance is the antithesis of mens rea, but where one is in
a special position to prevent harm, ignorance of that harm can indeed be deterred. Sometimes
harms ignorantly caused can be resolved in tort, and such has been the argument that criminal
punishment should be reserved in this manner for the morally blameworthy.24 There are
nonetheless certain remaining circumstances that require regulation and do not fit neatly into the
tort system,25 suggesting that the rule of mens rea needs to admit some exceptions.
B. Strict Liability Fills Enforcement Gaps Left by Requirement of Mens Rea
Many criminal statutes do not specify a mens rea element, but courts will presume it is
there where the statute codifies a common law offense, as mens rea was so deeply engrained in
the common law.26 However, around the middle of the nineteenth century a new sort of criminal
law began to develop, one which sought to regulate certain behaviors that may place the public
welfare at risk, and to do so without regard to fault.27 This “strict liability” has historically
applied to those engaged in a dangerous activity that places them in a position of responsibility to

23

See id. 216–17.
See Sayre, supra note 20, at 1003–04.
25
See id.
26
See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922) (“[T]he general rule at common law was that the
scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to
statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it . . .”); Colin Manchester, The Origins
of Strict Criminal Liability, 6 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 277, 277 (1977).
27
Manchester, supra note 26, at 277–83 (tracing the emergence of strict liability “regulatory offenses” to the rise of
the Industrial Revolution in the mid-1800s).
24
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the public, such as supplying goods or handling highly dangerous materials.28 Such offenses are
described as “public welfare” offenses, and the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that sodescribed offenses are generally the only kind that can be criminalized without requiring proof of
mens rea.29
Many scholars have battled strenuously against this trend, arguing that the criminalization
of “morally neutral” actions “dilute[s] the value of the criminal sanction and diminish[es] its
meaning.”30 They suggest that proponents of strict liability for public welfare offenses are
making a deal with the devil, trading the moral justification for criminal punishment for the
convenience of deterring harmful acts that do not stem from a guilty conscience.31 There is one
glaring fallacy in this argument: where there can be deterrence, there is by definition some matter
of choice, and therefore the existence of fault, even if too subliminal to meet a mens rea standard.
Where there is choice there is fault, and without choice there is no potential for deterrence. 32 Just
as traditional crimes come with a spectrum of mens rea levels—for instance, purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, and negligently, as we see in the Model Penal Code33—so too does
seemingly unintended harm, that which falls below the threshold for negligence. The choices at
issue merely come earlier in the strict liability context.
We all make risk-preventative choices every day for ourselves and our families: child
proofing our home when it houses a toddler, wearing a seatbelt though we have never been in an
28

See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607–09 (1994).
Id. at 616–19.
30
See Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content
of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1535 (1997) (citing the thread of scholarly criticism addressing
criminalization of regulatory offenses).
31
See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1995, at 72, 77
(“[C]riminal law is increasingly used against purely regulatory offenses, such as those involving the activities
permitted in public parks, the maintenance procedures at warehouses, and the foodstuffs that may be imported into a
state. The move is understandable: reformers seek to enlist the moral force implicit in criminal conviction for the
sake of deterrence—a force that civil liability does not carry. But the use of criminal conviction in the absence of
serious criminal harm that deserves moral condemnation weakens that very force. As the label ‘criminal’ is
increasingly applied to minor violations of a merely civil nature, criminal liability will increasingly become
indistinct from civil and will lose its particular stigma.”).
32
See Green, supra note 30, at 1579, 1591–92 (noting that the choice to act in violation of any law may have
“significant moral content,” indicating that mere illegality regardless of mens rea may have a deterrent effect).
33
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (Official Draft 1985).
29
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accident, and locking our front door when we know of no person ever having tried to open it
uninvited. Most such choices are not required of us, but when our activities interplay with the
outside world, when we are in a position to protect others from risk, we cannot always be
counted on to be as naturally protective as we are of ourselves and our families. This is where
strict liability public welfare offenses can step in to require us to proactively prevent harm—even
harm that we are not aware is taking place—because we alone are in a position to prevent it. It
is this special role of sole capability and responsibility, and not mens rea, which forms the
justification for criminal sanctions when the prohibited and preventable harm takes place.
C. Strict Liability Is Not Another Name for Negligence
The modern distillation of mens rea options tends to focus on the concepts of purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.34 While there are other mens rea terms in use, these are
the broad concepts they represent. Negligence is the lowest standard, and generally requires that
a defendant fail to live up to a duty of which he should have been aware but was not.35 When we
call people negligent we are saying that they should have been more careful, more conscious,
more proactive and on top of those things over which they have exercised some control, but we
are not calling them consciously careless, as that would move toward the standard for
recklessness.36 Ultimately, negligence is a very low standard, and one that can easily apply to
morally innocent people.
Strict liability, on the other hand, is the complete absence of any mens rea requirement at
all. Because it is not negligence, it is not necessary to consider what a reasonable person would
have done, or known about. We need not label the defendant careless or unconcerned. It is guilt
without moral fault. It is the person who drives over the speed limit not realizing that their
speedometer was off by ten miles per hour, which person may well have been the most
conservative, rule-following driver you have ever met. It is a rule the legislature has decided is
34

See id.
Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
36
DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 188 (2d ed. 2010).
35
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essential that everyone follow universally and without fail, and often one in which there is
difficulty in proving a mental state. It is a kind of harm society has determined that you simply
cannot cause, no matter how innocently. It is called “strict” for good reason.
Because strict liability applies regardless of knowledge, foreseeability of the harm itself41
is not an appropriate concern, as that is a concept wedded to the notion of a guilty mind. Of
course, some act, or omission where there was a duty to act, must still be present, as without an
actus reus there would be nothing left of a crime. Wholly passive behavior cannot be
criminalized.42 Strict liability is generally the approach taken when a legislature wants to hold
those who take on a special responsibility to a high standard of care, one that demands the search
for information about hazards that goes beyond that which they already knew or even should
have known.43 It is not another term for negligence, but rather the complete absence of any mens
rea at all: “Indeed, the premise of strict liability is that the defendant is held guilty no matter how
careful and morally innocent he or she, or one for whose acts he or she is responsible, has
been.”44
The landmark case defining strict criminal liability is United States v. Balint.45 In that
case the defendant was charged with selling narcotic drugs without a written order, in violation
of the Narcotic Act of 1914.46 Balint demurred to the indictment on the basis that it did not allege
that he knew the drug he sold was a narcotic drug, and the district court quashed the indictment
for this reason.47 The Supreme Court held that there was no knowledge requirement in the

41

As opposed to the actor’s general exposure to regulation based upon her involvements and authority. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284–85 (1943) (stating that regardless of an actor’s consciousness of
wrongdoing, Congress has placed the burden of determining risk on those actors—such as the president of a
company—who have an opportunity to inform themselves, rather than place the risk on the helpless public).
42
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228–30 (1957).
43
See Singer, supra note 17, at 389.
44
Id. at 356.
45
258 U.S. 250 (1922).
46
Id. at 251; Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C §§ 1040–1054 (1934)).
47
Balint, 258 U.S. at 251.
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statute, as well as no due process violation for its absence, and revived the indictment. 48 The
Court pointed out that this trend of criminal statutes without mens rea was necessary to address
matters in which enforcement may be impeded by such a requirement. 49 In the pursuit of social
betterment, those who cause proscribed harm may be punished in spite of their complete
ignorance as to the facts that caused the harm.50 The Balint Court accepted the fact that
sometimes innocent parties would be convicted, noting that Congress had weighed that concern
against the harm to be avoided by the statute, factoring in the difficulty involved in proving
knowledge under the relevant circumstances.51
The classic example used to teach the concept of strict criminal liability is statutory rape,
which is virtually always a strict liability offense.52 Where, for instance, a state legislature has set
the age of consent for sexual intercourse at sixteen, if a defendant of sufficient age under the
statute has sex with a fifteen-year-old, he is guilty of the offense regardless of his knowledge of
her age.53 He is guilty in spite of a reasonable belief that she was eighteen. Such belief may be
based on her own statements, her appearance, even her enrollment in college—it would not
matter how great the reasons for the belief—he is still guilty of the offense.54 He is given the
duty to ascertain without fail that the person with whom he engages in sexual activity is old
enough to consent to that activity.55 This is because the protection of youthful innocence has
48

Id. at 252, 254.
Id. at 251–52.
50
Id. at 252 (noting that the Court in Shevlin-Carpenter “held that in the prohibition or punishment of particular
acts, the State may in the maintenance of a public policy provide ‘that he who shall do them shall do them at his
peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance’” (quoting Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v.
Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69–70 (1910))).
51
Id. at 254.
52
See Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim’s Age as Defense to Statutory Rape,
46 A.L.R. 5TH 499, 508 (1997).
53
See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (West 2011); see also Campbell, supra note 52, at 510–13 (listing states
that follow the strict liability rule).
54
See, e.g., Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 798–99, 803–04 (Md. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the exclusion of
evidence that a mentally retarded man had a reasonable belief that the age difference between the victim and himself
was within the statutory limit).
55
See, e.g., id. at 802–05 (noting that although two-fifths of the states allow a defense of reasonable mistake as to
the victim’s age, the statutes of the majority of states impose strict liability in cases of statutory rape, placing the risk
of mistake as to the victim’s age solely on the defendant).
49
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outweighed, as a policy matter, his entitlement to act in ignorance. The most famous case
supporting this long tradition is Regina v. Prince,56 from the nineteenth century. This area of
strict criminal liability likely set the stage for the proliferation of such offenses throughout the
twentieth century.
Another classic case demonstrating just how far courts are willing to go in punishing
without mens rea is State v. Lindberg.57 The banking statute at issue in that case provided that
“[e]very director and officer of any bank . . . who shall borrow . . . any of its funds in an
excessive amount . . . shall . . . be guilty of a felony.”58 The defendant argued that he could not
be charged with the offense because not only did he not know the money came from his bank,
but he had even been assured by the bank official processing the loan that the money came from
a different bank.59 However, the court held that the reasonableness of the defendant’s mistake
was not a defense because the statute did not require proof of mens rea.60 The act of borrowing
money that in fact came from his own bank was a violation of the statute without regard to his
lack of knowledge of the key facts making it so.61
If there is no need for culpability, where does guilt come from in the context of strict
criminal liability? It is sufficient to have authority over the conditions which led to the
proscribed harm.62 Such responsibility encourages one to seek out every possible necessity for
care, not just those which he knows about or even should have known about—the latter being the
standard for negligence.63 This is not to say that it is simply a higher standard of care, beyond the

56

(1875) L.R. 2 C.C.R. 154, 175–76 (holding that a defendant’s bona fide and reasonable belief that a girl is older
than 16 is not a defense against an indictment for unlawfully taking an unmarried girl under the age of 16 from her
father).
57
215 P. 41 (Wash. 1923).
58
WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3259 (Remington 1932) (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 30.12.060–
30.12.070 (2010)).
59
Lindberg, 215 P. at 44–45.
60
Id. at 45, 47.
61
Id.
62
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670–71 (1975).
63
See, e.g., id. at 672.
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reasonable to the extraordinary, as this would still fall within the concept of mens rea.64 Rather,
it is entirely irrelevant whether the defendant should have known, or even should have
discovered with great effort, that the risk was there. It is sufficient that the defendant had
authority over the conditions creating the risk—and ultimately causing the harm—and that
avoidance of the harm was possible.65 While acting with due care to avoid proscribed harms is
not sufficient to defend against a strict liability charge, it is certainly the sort of behavior such a
statute encourages, thereby going beyond negligence.
D. Strict Liability Does Have Limits
Of course, the leeway to create criminal sanctions without regard to fault is not
unfettered. There are, as there must be, due process limitations to such a development. In United
States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. (International Minerals),66 the Supreme
Court tied the concept of strict criminal liability to the involvement in activities one might expect
to be regulated, such as when shipping dangerous substances—as was at issue in that case67—or
selling drugs—as in Balint.68 The Court noted that while “[p]encils, dental floss, [and] paper
clips may also be regulated,” doing so would raise serious due process concerns absent a mens
rea requirement.69 It is this concept that forms the foundation of my ultimate proposals for
directing MBTA enforcement.70
In Staples v. United States71 the Court was not directly focused on a due process
violation, but rather construed a firearms regulation as having a mens rea requirement in spite of
its silence on the matter.72 However, the Court did so in an apparent attempt to avoid a due
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See Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1131–33
(1997) (arguing that strict liability does not entail a duty to use “extraordinary care”).
65
See, e.g., Park, 421 U.S. at 671–72, 674.
66
402 U.S. 558 (1971).
67
Id. at 563–65.
68
Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922).
69
International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564–65.
70
See discussion infra Part V.
71
511 U.S. 600 (1994).
72
Id. at 619.
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process problem73 because the Court focused on two ways of limiting the potential for strict
criminal liability. First, it considered the International Minerals characterization of strict liability
regulatory or public welfare offenses as being those in which the defendant is engaged in some
sort of potentially harmful or injurious activity.74 Although the statute at issue in Staples
regulated automatic weapons, the Court held—but with only five justices agreeing on this
point—that because gun ownership is so extremely common, an automatic weapon could not
qualify as a dangerous item one might expect to be regulated. 75 This position is, not surprisingly,
highly controversial.76 The second basis for the Court’s requirement of mens rea added a
limitation on the extent of punishment that may be available under a strict liability statute.77
While not ruling out strict liability for felonies—Balint involved a felony with imprisonment of
up to five years and was not overruled in Staples—the Court held that the ten-year imprisonment
potential upon conviction under the National Firearms Act78 was too severe a punishment for
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See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564–65 (noting possible due process questions raised if Congress were to
regulate products that are not “dangerous or deleterious” or “obnoxious waste materials” without requiring a mens
rea element); see also Alex Arensberg, Note, Are Migratory Birds Extending Environmental Criminal Liability?, 38
ECOLOGY L.Q. 427, 429–30 (2011) (explaining possible due process consequences of strict criminal liability, but
noting that public welfare offenses do not necessarily need mens rea to satisfy constitutional due process concerns
because regulation of those offenses is foreseeable).
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Mar.
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households own a car).
76
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those convicted without proof of mens rea—treating this as an indication of legislative intent to
require mens rea, rather than as a due process violation, so the statute was not invalidated.79
These limiting cases are about determining whether strict liability is permissible, and not
how it is applied once it is determined to be the standard. Thus, they cease to be relevant once
courts have agreed that a statute does, in fact, apply strict liability. Once it has been determined
that the context is appropriate for strict liability, that the seriousness of punishment is acceptable,
and that strict criminal liability was the intent of the legislature, all that remains is the case-bycase question of whether the harm was within the control of the defendant.
E. Foreseeability Has Limited Application to Strict Liability
Strict criminal liability is not limited to harms that were foreseeable. Indeed, it is quite
common among scholars, when arguing that a particular law does not impose strict liability, to
use as evidence of this point the fact that it hinges on foreseeability of the relevant harm. 80 This
foreseeability requirement before imposing guilt is what distinguishes the given law from those
imposing strict criminal liability. When we call something foreseeable, we are saying that it
could or should have been foreseen, which is logically indistinguishable from the “should have
known” standard, which is the test for negligence.81 Instead, “the premise of strict liability is that
the defendant is held guilty no matter how careful and morally innocent he or she . . . has
been.”82
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Staples, 511 U.S. at 615–16, 618–19, 635 n.20.
See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility Under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal
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when a court allowed an eviction despite the lack of foreseeability for events that violated relevant requirements);
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Some courts have erroneously taken foreseeability into account in the context of strict
liability by couching it in terms of proximate causation.83 While lack of proximate causation can
indeed be a defense to strict liability, this is so only to the extent that it negates the actus reus.84
It is a fallacy to view it as an aspect of the mens rea, such that foreseeability considerations are
broadly permissible, as there is no mens rea in strict liability crimes. The manner in which lack
of foreseeability can eliminate proximate causation and aid in a criminal defendant’s case is
where there is some superseding intervening cause of the harm,85 such as when the defendant
displayed the required document on his car and it was removed by another in his absence,86 or
where some malicious criminal has tampered with the end product on its way to consumers.87
The proximate causation defense, however, “has limited use for strict liability crimes. If a
defendant is directly involved in the prohibited action, the defense is unavailable.”88
While foreseeability issues can arise in determining proximate causation, they have
traditionally been limited in scope. Proximate causation is largely the absence of a superseding
intervening cause.89 Not all intervening causes are superseding causes, and only the latter break
the proximate causation.90 First, we look to whether the intervening cause is responsive—in that
it was brought on by the defendant’s actions—or purely coincidental.91 If the former, that is
generally the end of the inquiry—absent very unusual circumstances—it is not a superseding
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cause and the defendant has proximately caused the end result.92 If it is purely coincidental, then
and only then do we begin to consider foreseeability of the intervening cause to determine
whether it is a superseding cause relieving the defendant of responsibility for the resulting
harm.93 As discussed in People v. Rideout:94
For a defendant’s conduct to be regarded as a proximate cause, the victim’s injury
must be a “direct and natural result” of the defendant’s actions. In making this
determination, it is necessary to examine whether there was an intervening cause
that superseded the defendant’s conduct such that the causal link between the
defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury was broken. If an intervening cause
did indeed supersede the defendant’s act as a legally significant causal factor,
then the defendant’s conduct will not be deemed a proximate cause of the victim’s
injury.95
According to Professor Dressler’s treatise, a responsive intervening cause will typically
not relieve the defendant of liability, while a coincidental intervening cause will typically relieve
the defendant of liability unless foreseeability of the intervention can be established.96 In
discussing responsive intervening causes, Professor Dressler suggests two examples: first, a boat
passenger drowning while attempting to swim to shore after the boat capsizes, and second, a
victim, wounded by a defendant, who dies after being treated negligently by medical
professionals.97 In cases of responsive intervening causes, the harm at issue comes from actions
taken in response to the defendant’s conduct.98 A coincidental intervening cause, on the other
hand, might be as little as the defendant putting the victim “in the wrong place at the wrong
time,” such as if the wounded victim in Professor Dressler’s example above is attacked by a
“knife-wielding maniac” while waiting in the emergency room for treatment.99
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In the end, proximate causation “is a legal construct designed to prevent criminal liability
from attaching when the result of the defendant’s conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural.
Thus, a proximate cause is simply a factual cause of which the law will take cognizance.”100
Relieving defendants of liability for lack of proximate causation is thus reserved for truly special
circumstances, in which what has occurred is highly unusual, not logically related to the
defendant’s actions, and not likely to occur again if the defendant continues with the same
behavior.
Even where foreseeability does become relevant, it does not necessarily mean foreseeable
to the ordinary person. Given that the trend toward strict liability offenses has primarily been in
the context of public welfare concerns brought on by the Industrial Revolution,101 there must
certainly be a subjective component to the objective question. In other words, while the ordinary
person may not foresee that tightly sealed drums containing toxic waste might degrade and leach
the waste into the ground, a person in the business of creating or storing such waste should find
this foreseeable. If we were to inject a foreseeable-to-all requirement into public welfare strict
liability offenses, there would be no such thing as strict liability. The entire point of the existence
of public welfare strict liability offenses is that the defendants are in a special position to prevent
a harm that the average person would know nothing about.
F. Strict Liability in the Environmental Context
Although strict liability always requires less culpability than negligence, regardless of
context, it is generally especially strict and fault-free in the environmental context. Some
scholars have suggested that, just as there are gradations of mens rea, there are also gradations,
or at least one split-point, to strict liability.102 One example of this is the distinction between
100
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“pure” and “impure” strict liability.103 As Professor Simons describes it, pure strict liability
requires absolutely no culpability as to any material element of the offense, whereas impure strict
liability requires culpability as to at least one material element but does not require culpability as
to at least one other element, at least in the sense of some intentional act.104 The examples he
chose for each are useful. Statutory rape is an example of impure strict liability, in that one must
intentionally engage in sexual intercourse, though it is not necessary to be aware of—or even
negligent as to—the other participant’s age.105 The example he chose as the quintessential pure
strict liability category of crime was environmental crime, “inasmuch as the offender need only
cause defined forms of environmental risks or harms (such as exposing the public to certain
pollutants or toxins in excess of a specified level), and it is irrelevant that she lacked negligence,
knowledge, or any other culpability in causing those risks or harms.”106
Environmental crime follows in the footsteps of a long line of strict liability crimes
applicable to corporate officers.107 Generally referred to as “public welfare offenses,” this line of
strict liability crimes developed in response to concerns regarding the dangers brought about by
the Industrial Revolution.108 Progress has a dark side, in that it leads to activities, such as those
directed at harnessing natural resources or those enabling mass production and distribution of
products, that intrude on the natural state of being and create previously nonexistent dangers.
These dangers may be directly to human beings, or to wildlife, or indirectly to both by harming
the environment we share. These concerns are so great, and the decision to involve oneself in
such enterprises so forward, that strict liability has been morally and constitutionally accepted in
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such contexts.109 The development of these strict liability public welfare offenses reflected a
“shift of emphasis from the protection of individual interests” to the “protection of public and
social interests.”110 The use of strict liability in these contexts places full responsibility for
dangers—whether known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen—in the hands of the only people
in a position to prevent the harm.111
Of course, the use of a negligence standard generally shifts responsibility for risks to
those in authority as well, but
[O]nly under strict liability are individuals imprisoned even if they take all
possible precautions to act reasonably. The sole question for the trier of fact is
whether the defendant committed the proscribed act. The jury may not decide
whether the defendant could have done anything else to prevent the unlawful
act.112
One good reason for this method of placing risk responsibility on the shoulders of those in
control of major industrial activities is that it would be extremely difficult for jurors—or even
courts—to properly assess what should qualify as reasonable care in such complex or
extraordinary circumstances.113 Not only might jurors attempting to apply a negligence standard
lead to “inconsistent, unpredictable, and biased” verdicts in these contexts, but there is also a
significant risk that commonly shared views on appropriate standards of care may vary from one
community to the next.114
Strict liability in these contexts also has nearly the same moral force as a negligence
standard would. 115 Underlying the standard is a presumption that nearly all who are convicted
109
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thereby were in fact negligent, but proof of such negligence is difficult and unreliable.116 To the
extent that a few wholly innocent defendants are punished, this result is deemed outweighed by
the significant harms such offenses generally are targeted to avoid, also taking into account the
typically light punishments in the balance.117 In this sense, choosing to impose strict liability is a
legislature’s way of expressing that this is a danger we take very seriously and wish to avoid at
all costs.118 Beware to those who engage in large-scale or otherwise risky activities.
Ultimately, when it comes to public welfare offenses, we are simply willing to take the
risk of punishing some nonnegligent actors in order to ensure the greatest possible avoidance of a
particularly disconcerting danger.
The rationale of the doctrine of strict criminal liability is that, although
criminal sanctions are relied upon, the primary purpose of the statutes is
regulation rather than punishment or correction, and that the interest of
enforcement for the public health and safety requires the risk that an occasional
non-offender may be punished in order to prevent the escape of a greater number
of culpable offenders.119
This, of course, is the opposite of the usual philosophy of American criminal law, that we should
allow many guilty people to go free before convicting even one innocent person, which

In these cases it is the duty of the defendant to know what the facts are.
Ex parte Marley, 175 P.2d 832, 835 (Cal. 1946) (en banc) (quoting State v. Weisberg, 55 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Ohio Ct.
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Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 173–
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philosophy forms the basis for the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.120 But that is
what distinguishes strict criminal liability offenses: they deal with matters so great, and impose
punishment so minimal,121 that the balance has been shifted the other way.
It is essential to note that, especially in the critical but not always universally appreciated
area of environmental protection, strict criminal liability may indeed be the only means of getting
corporate executives to take all possible precautions.122 The argument is that, given the corporate
priority of profit maximization, mere corporate fines may simply be rolled into the cost of doing
business, often being well worth the financial benefits derived from environmental sloppiness,
such that corporate officers will not have adequate incentive to take every possible precaution.123
Thus, exposing the corporate officers to criminal convictions, and the resulting punishments, is
the only way to achieve complete vigilance.
The quintessential discussion of the philosophy and moral justification for strict criminal
liability is found in Morissette v. United States.124 The moral support for the strict liability
standard comes from its development in relation to public welfare offenses—out of concern for
the dangers created by the many new trades that sprung from the Industrial Revolution:
Many of these offenses are not in the nature of positive aggressions or invasions,
with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where
the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty. Many violations of
120
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such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but
merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to
minimize. . . . Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy,
does not specify intent as a necessary element. The accused, if he does not will
the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society
might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact
from one who assumed his responsibilities.125
For this reason the Court held that, while it supported strict criminal liability in this regulatory
context, it would not apply it to traditional common law crimes based on moral culpability—
larceny, in that case.126 Environmental crimes are the direct descendants of the original
development of regulatory public welfare offenses. Environmental harm is generally caused,
whether knowingly or not, by those who are “in a position to prevent it with no more care than
society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one
who assumed his responsibilities.”127
IV. THE LATEST APPELLATE CASE TO ADDRESS MBTA LIABILITY
The Supreme Court has yet to address the standard for criminal liability under the
MBTA. Indeed, a Westlaw search reveals that the Court has only so much as mentioned the
statute a handful of times. Thus, advocates have been forced to develop the area in lower courts,
mostly at the trial court level. Of the handful of appellate cases discussing the application of the
strict liability standard under the MBTA, only two deal with the most essential modern area of
enforcement: an industrial setting resulting in indirect harm—as opposed to the hunting context,
which is not the focus of this Article. The first is United States v. FMC Corp.,128 a well-known
case for upholding strict liability under the MBTA as against a defendant who was not aware of
the “lethal-to-birds quality” of his runoff ponds.129 The FMC Court handled the issue of the
MBTA’s theoretically broad reach by entrusting it to disciplined use of prosecutorial
discretion.130 While this case has been highly regarded and often cited—after all, until last year it
125

Id. at 253–56.
Id. at 260, 262.
127
Id. at 256 (discussing public welfare offenses generally).
128
572 F. Supp. 2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
129
Id. at 903, 908.
130
Id. at 905.
126

23

was the only appellate case on the matter—it is also well over three decades old, and now we
have a new appellate case to reckon with in this context. As the only appellate case since FMC to
address the application of strict MBTA liability to industrial actors, or even to indirect harm in
general, this latest case out of the Tenth Circuit requires some attention.
United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc.131 involved two defendants, Apollo and Walker,
both owners of oil drilling operations.132

These operations used numerous heater-treaters,

devices with exhaust pipes that frequently entrap birds absent a simple protective screen, which
was lacking in both defendants’ heater-treaters.133 After finding several hundred dead birds
trapped in heater-treaters in the region—southeast Kansas—the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) engaged in a public awareness campaign in the area regarding the heater-treater problem,
sending letters to individual oil companies in the area, including Apollo, but not Walker. 134 The
campaign included posters, industry presentations, TV news stories, and an Associated Press
story.135 As a matter of prosecutorial discretion, FWS chose not to recommend prosecution for
the MBTA violations pre-dating the campaign—for the dead birds that prompted the
campaign.136
Apollo’s violation took place after it was directly notified of the issue by FWS during its
campaign.137 Walker’s violations both took place after the informational campaign, but he did
not receive a direct FWS letter until after his first violation—after which he still did nothing to
screen his heater-treaters; the second violation was a year after the first and its corresponding
letter.138 The lower court convicted on all counts, based on the applicable strict liability standard,
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as the unscreened heater-treaters were within the defendants’ control.139 The Tenth Circuit
upheld strict liability as the standard for liability, but held that strict liability only satisfies due
process if the defendants proximately caused the proscribed harm.140 The convictions for both
Apollo and Walker for the violations that took place after receipt of the letter were affirmed, but
Walker’s conviction for the violation that took place well after the campaign but before his own
letter—which was prompted by this violation—was reversed for lack of proximate causation.141
In spite of the court’s stated approval of strict liability for MBTA misdemeanors,
Walker’s testimony that he did not know about the heater-treater problem prior to his first
violation142 was the basis for the court’s reversal of that count.143 The district court had found
proximate causation to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt because trapped birds were a direct
consequence of failing to screen the access holes to the heater-treater.144 The defendant’s lack of
knowledge was not part of the equation in the lower court, as it was applying a strict liability
standard.145
The Tenth Circuit, however, based its determination of whether the defendants
proximately caused the bird deaths on “what knowledge the defendants had or should have had
of birds potentially dying in their heater-treaters.”146 This language evokes a “knew or should
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have known” standard, which is not appropriate in a strict liability context.147 If such
knowledge—that a defendant had or should have had—were required, the standard would be one
of at least negligence. To make matters worse, the lower court made findings of fact that “birds
trapped in heater/treaters [were] relatively common in the industry,” and that “oil operators have
been aware for some time that bird remains are frequently found in heater/treaters.”148 The Tenth
Circuit simply disagreed with the lower court on these findings of fact.149 Given that dead birds
were found in both defendants’ heater-treaters on every FWS inspection,150 it is hard to believe
that the concept of bird attraction to these devices was entirely new to them. Nevertheless, in the
context of strict liability public welfare offenses, the fact that the bird deaths were common
should not have mattered. Where the commonality of the problem is relevant, however, is in the
sense that it completely rules out the notion that it was such an absurd result as to wipe out
proximate causation.151 Indeed, there was not even any intervening cause at all, neither
responsive nor coincidental—the defendants’ actions directly caused the harm.
The Apollo Energies court apparently derived its foreseeability analysis, requiring
knowledge of the dangers posed by heater-treaters, from the due process concept of “notice”
requirements.152 It placed great focus on Lambert v. California,153 in which the Supreme Court
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held that due process required notice “where a person, wholly passive and unaware of any
wrongdoing,” fails to affirmatively act as the law requires, and is criminally liable for that
failure.154 Lambert involved a requirement to register as a felon if present in the state, where such
presence was not an activity likely to trigger an expectation of regulation absent notice, which
the Supreme Court expressly distinguished from other public welfare offenses where people are
involved in potentially harmful activities.155 The Apollo Energies court analogized the need for
notice in Lambert to the FWS notice of the heater-treater problem, such that only those who had
received the FWS letters had adequate notice to support due process, which the court called an
indistinguishable issue from that of proximate causation.156
This MBTA case bears absolutely no resemblance to Lambert. One cannot credibly
define the operation of an oil rig as “wholly passive.”157 As discussed in Part III.D, the Supreme
Court has held that in the context of activities that a reasonable person would expect might be
regulated, such as those with the potential to cause harm, strict criminal liability is
constitutional.158 The Court has spoken clearly regarding the importance of activities one might
expect to be regulated, but has said nothing about the ability to predict the specific factual
harm—as this suggests a “knew or should have known” standard and would not be strict liability.
In a time and place where there are numerous environmental restrictions on industrial activities,
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in place for nearly four decades159 at the times relevant to Apollo Energies, there can be no doubt
that a reasonable person would expect regulation of the activity of operating an oil rig. To
describe such a party as “wholly passive” and without notice of the potential for regulation
offends reason.160 Lambert lacked actus reus, but in the environmental context, the actus reus is
the operation of the plant that causes the harm.161 A requirement that the operator knows of the
specific harm itself would be about mens rea, and thus would go beyond the mere actus reus
requirement of a strict liability offense.162
The Apollo Energies court took the expectation that parties be on notice of the potential
for regulation of their activities and twisted it into a requirement that the government provide
individualized written notice of each particular risk of harm in order to hold the parties
responsible for that harm.163 In unprecedented fashion, the court suggests the government must
track down every potential violator, in advance of their violation, and then affirmatively and
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individually warn them not to commit the violation—a requirement that would be impossible for
agencies to meet.
This approach also counters decades of preceding cases. In addition to those already
discussed above,164 in the 1990s three district court cases found mine operators strictly liable
under the MBTA for the deaths of migratory birds that were drawn to ponds of water laced with
cyanide as a result of the leaching processes involved in mining for precious metals.165 In these
cases the miners had no idea these ponds were attracting and killing migratory birds, but much
like Apollo’s and Walker’s heater-treaters (at least as the lower court held), they were
responsible for the dangerous-to-birds attraction whether they knew birds were drawn to it or
not. Around the same time, Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company were held strictly
criminally liable for migratory bird deaths that resulted from an accidental oil spill that followed
a shipping disaster.166
Arguably the most similar case to Apollo Energies is United States v. Moon Lake Electric
Ass’n (Moon Lake).167 Moon Lake involved migratory bird deaths resulting from electrocution by
the defendant’s electric power poles.168 Just as birds had always been drawn to heater-treaters
and then trapped inside, birds had historically died from such pole and power line
electrocutions.169 Likewise, just as the heater-treater problem was easily resolved with screens,
the electric poles could have been rendered safer via the installation of inexpensive equipment.170
It was the failure to install such equipment that resulted in the defendant’s charges in both Moon
Lake and the lower court in Apollo Energies. The Moon Lake court based its analysis for finding
proximate cause on differentiating the defendant’s activities from those that everyday ordinary
164
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individuals engage in, which may at some point result in the death of a migratory bird. 171 The
special operations involved had a probable consequence of resulting in bird deaths.172
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit opinion in Apollo Energies does not merely reverse the holding
below, it runs counter to nearly all lower court opinions on this issue to date, as well as the only
prior appellate opinion on the topic.173
Another line of cases, decided before the MBTA was amended to require mens rea,
applied strict liability for the offense of hunting over bait; these cases nearly unanimously held
that hunters did not have to know an area was baited to be held criminally liable.174 Applying the
reasoning of Apollo Energies to these cases would limit criminal liability to those who had been
directly warned that an area was baited, a limitation no court previously required. One case that
applied a “knew or should have known standard,”175 was widely criticized176 and was later
indirectly overruled.177 Of course, as a result of legislative amendment, “knew or should have
known” is now the standard the MBTA expressly applies to hunting over bait.
Appellate courts that have previously addressed the constitutionality of the MBTA’s
strict liability provision have held that it does not offend the requirements of due process.178 As
the Seventh Circuit noted:
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The late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once pointed out the distinction between
criminal and non-criminal intent: “Even a dog distinguishes between being
stumbled over and being kicked.” In strict liability cases, like this one, both
stumbling over and kicking a dog result in criminal liability.179
The point is clear: strict liability is liability without fault.
If the MBTA is to maintain its strict liability standard as it continues its progression into
the world of environmental restrictions on industrial behavior, the reasoning of Apollo Energies
simply cannot be accepted. Its current status as the latest and nearly exclusive appellate position
on the issue renders it particularly dangerous. At some point the Supreme Court will need to
weigh in on this issue. In the meantime, some proposals are offered in the next Part for
restructuring our regulatory and enforcement scheme to create a morally defensible master plan.
Not all courts are willing to place their trust in prosecutorial discretion where a statute has such
sweeping potential to criminalize everyday living—having windows, non-negligent driving of a
motor vehicle, etc.180—so prosecutorial policy must be expressed clearly in advance.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MBTA’S ENFORCEMENT FUTURE
It has been posited that “[t]he MBTA in many ways acts as a skeleton upon which the
implementing regulations necessarily place the flesh.”181 The MBTA completely outlaws taking,
killing, or possessing migratory birds “at any time, by any means or in any manner,” 182 applying
strict criminal liability for misdemeanor violations,183 but then states that the Secretary of the
Interior is:
[A]uthorized and directed . . . to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by
what means, it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow hunting,
taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, transportation,
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carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, and to adopt
suitable regulations permitting and governing the same.184
In other words, Congress made a sweeping prohibition that would be unrealistic to enforce—a
prohibition that could, at some point, touch nearly everyone’s activities—and then asked the
Secretary to carve out an enforceable plan.
If the government hopes to escape the inappropriate and impractical limitation on strict
liability imposed by Apollo Energies, it must develop limiting regulations or written enforcement
policies that address the concerns courts have regarding the potential over-inclusiveness of the
MBTA. By properly limiting its reach and protecting truly passive or ordinary individuals
expressly, and not just with its own case-by-case prosecutorial discretion, the government—the
Departments of the Interior and Justice—can prevent the kind of bad law created by Apollo
Energies. Such an express policy might even obtain a supportive constitutional or interpretive
holding in the highest court, should it take on the matter.
Even the FMC court, which upheld the application of strict liability to corporate actors in
the industrial context, expressed some reservations:
Certainly construction that would bring every killing within the statute, such as
deaths caused by automobiles, airplanes, plate glass modern office buildings or
picture windows in residential dwellings into which birds fly, would offend
reason and common sense. . . . Such situations properly can be left to the sound
discretion of prosecutors and the courts.185
This makes sense in relation to the due process justification for applying strict liability at all: the
defendant is engaged in an activity that he might reasonably expect to be regulated in some way.
He need not know precisely how his actions are regulated—ignorance of the law is no defense.
Nor must he know of the facts that result in a violation of the law—as this would be a mens rea
requirement, which is absent under strict liability. To incur liability, a defendant must simply
know that he is engaged in a sort of activity—over which he has authority—that the government
may wish to regulate.
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My question is this: why limit our effort to focus MBTA application on such individuals
to case-by-case prosecutorial discretion? Doing so risks generating opinions, like Apollo
Energies, which create broadly applicable bad law in either an effort to disagree with the
prosecutorial choice in that instance, or perhaps out of general distrust of prosecutorial discretion
in the context of an unbridled criminal statute such as the MBTA. The prosecution has no facesaving regulation to point to, or even a fair and comprehensive written prosecutorial policy.
Providing some structure, where there currently is little, may well save the day.
We need limiting regulations that restrict the scope of MBTA prosecution to those
engaged in industrial and commercial activity and those otherwise engaged in unusually
hazardous—even if noncommercial—activities. This could then be bolstered by a prosecutorial
policy that interprets the regulations to sufficiently limit the scope of potential defendants to
those engaged in activities one might expect to be regulated, thus rendering a pure strict liability
approach—without further foreseeability requirements—appropriate. Indeed, even if the
Department of the Interior did only the latter, it could go a long way in achieving the goals I
suggest, which are as follows:
1. Provide a uniform system to determine which cases to prosecute
within the government’s otherwise extremely broad authority;
2. Ensure clear communication of these prosecutorial priorities
between the Departments of the Interior and Justice;
3. Create a written interpretation of the statute that saves it from
potential constitutional weaknesses;
4. Assure the courts that the government is cognizant of due process
concerns inherent in the Act’s potential reach, perhaps preventing
judges from feeling the need to carve out these limits via court
opinions; and
5. Place industrial actors and others involved in potentially
hazardous-to-birds activities on notice that they are the
prosecutorial targets of the Act, rendering it more likely that they
will engage in the necessary due diligence to avoid a violation in
the first place.
If the Department of the Interior chooses to accomplish this task via regulation, it would
be advantageous to frame it as an interpretation of the intended reach of the statute. There are
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two reasons for this. First, such an interpretation, in the context of rulemaking, would be entitled
to Chevron deference if challenged.186 Second, to the extent that Congress delegated the policy
question of the criminal reach of the statute,187 a party who disagrees with the policies expressed
in the regulations may attempt a nondelegation challenge. That said, even without expressing the
regulatory choices as statutory interpretation, such a challenge would be weak; nondelegation
challenges rarely succeed188 and issues with MBTA’s reach are arguably more about
prosecutorial discretion than legislative policy. An additional upside to addressing this issue via
notice and comment regulations is that the administrative discussion process will ensure wider
dissemination of the new policies than would be likely via written policy alone.
Should FWS choose not to address this issue through regulatory drafting and the
corresponding full notice and comment rulemaking process, most of the goals I have listed can
be accomplished—arguably all of them, albeit to a slightly diminished extent—via a written
policy statement. Despite the fact that a policy statement would be entitled to a lower level of
deference if challenged, I believe that a court would uphold the policies I propose as consistent
with existing Supreme Court interpretations of the due process limits on strict liability in the
environmental public welfare offense context. A discussion of this case law should be included
in the written policy and presented as the basis for it. I would also recommend that the policy be
drafted and issued jointly by the Department of the Interior—FWS—and the Department of
Justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given that the due process concerns associated with strict criminal liability are alleviated
in the context of predictably regulated activities, and that such activities result in most of the
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MBTA violations of concern for prosecution, it is time for the Department of the Interior to
express its target more clearly in regulations or a written policy. Such a self-imposed limitation
would help prevent overreaching limitations imposed by misguided court decisions, which can
be quite damaging. Not only would such a policy have left room for the prosecutions in Apollo
Energies, but it may have prevented the resulting reversal and corresponding bad law that could
impact many prosecutions to come.
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